Josie Ann Gunderson v. The May Department Stores Company, Payless Shoe Source, Inc. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Josie Ann Gunderson v. The May Department
Stores Company, Payless Shoe Source, Inc. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Leonard E. McGee; Lehman, Jensen & Donahue; Attorneys for Appellant.
Lynn Davies; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Josie Ann Gunderson v. The May Department Stores Company, Payless Shoe Source, Inc., No. 970178 (Utah Court of
Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/752
» ' « " COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH B R ' E F 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
/^>f ( /O 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOSIE ANN GUNDERSON, 
Appellant, 
vs, 
THE MAY DEPARTMENT STORES COMPANY, 
a New York Corporation and PAYLESS 
SHOE SOURCE, INC., a Missouri 
Corporation, 
Appellees. 
Case No. 97017! 
Category 15 
No. 940901812 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS PRESIDING 
LEONARD E. McGEE - A2185 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
620 Judge Building 
8 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-7858 
Lynn Davies 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Appellees 
P.O. Box 2465 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84110-2465 
(801)531-2000 1 1 laws 
JUL 1 8 1997 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOSIE ANN GUNDERSON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
THE MAY DEPARTMENT STORES COMPANY, 
a New York Corporation and PAYLESS 
SHOE SOURCE, INC., a Missouri 
Corporation, 
Appellees. 
Case No. 97017! 
Category 15 
No. 940901812 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE LESLIE LEWIS PRESIDING 
LEONARD E. McGEE - A2185 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
620 Judge Building 
8 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-7858 
Lynn Davies 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Appellees 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
(801)531-2000 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Course of the Proceedings 3 
C. Disposition in Trail Court 4 
D. Statement of Facts 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 11 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM BRINGING AN ACTION 
FOR BAD FAITH AND FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST HER EMPLOYER BECAUSE 
THE UTAH WORKER'S COMPENSATION STATUTE, U.C.A. 
§35-1-60, ET SEQ., PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
FOR PLAINTIFF 11 
A. THE UTAH CODE DOES NOT PRECLUDE A CIVIL ACTION 
AGAINST A FORMER EMPLOYER 11 
B. FAILURE TO PAY APPELLANT' S BILLS 13 
C. APPELLEES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH ORDERS OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 14 
D. NO UTAH STATUTE PRECLUDES DISTRICT COURT ACTION 
BY THE APPELLANT 17 
11 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAINTAIN A BAD FAITH CLAIM 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS BARRED BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF 
DID NOT SUFFER ACTUAL PHYSICAL INJURY FROM THE 
DEFENDANTS ACTIONS 2 
CONCLUSION 2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 2 
ill 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
A. Cases 
Aranda v. Insurance Company of North America, 748 S.W. 2d 
550 (Tex. 1988) 15 
Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co., 273 N.W. 2d 
220 (Wise. 1979) 15 
Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Insurance Co., 387 A.2d 220 
(Maine 1978) 13 
Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 858 P.2d 970 
(Utah 1993) 22 
Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992) 24, 
25, 26 
Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters, 609 P. 2d 257 (Mont. 1980) 
14 
Hollman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 712 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 
1983) 13 
Izaquirre v. Texas Employees Insurance Association, 749 
S.W. 2d 550 (Texas Ct. App. 1988) 15, 16 
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) 22-23, 24 
Kaluza v. Home Insurance Co., 403 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1987) 13 
Pixton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
809 P.2d 746, (Utah App. 1991) 19, 22 
Savage v. Educator' s Insurance Co., 874 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 
1994) 16, 18, 20, 21, 22 
iv 
Tallman v. Hanssen, 427 N.W. 868 (Iowa 1988) 12 
B. Statutes and Other Authorities 
U.C.A. §35-1-60 (1953), as amended 12 
U.C.A. §35-1-78 (1953), as amended 17 
U.C.A. §31A-26-103 (1953), as amended 17 
U.C.A. §31A-26-301 (1953), as amended 17 
U.C.A. §3lA-26-303 (1953), as amended 18 
v 
The Appellant, Josie Ann Gunderson, pursuant to Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this 
Appeal Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to 
decide this appeal pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the plaintiff 
is barred from bringing an action for bad faith and for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress against her 
employer because the Utah Worker's Compensation statute, 
U.C.A. §35-1-60, et seq., provides the exclusive remedy for 
plaintiff? 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the plaintiff 
cannot maintain a bad faith claim against the defendants? 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that the 
plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress was barred because the plaintiff did not suffer 
actual physical injury from the Defendants actions? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The facts set forth in this brief, and as found by the 
Court below, are not in dispute. 
The trial court's legal conclusions should be given no 
deference and should be reviewed for legal correctness. 
General Glass Corp. V. Mast Construction Co., 754 P.2d 438 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The following statutory provisions and case law are 
determinative of the issues on appeal: 
U.C.A. §35-1-60 (1953), as amended; 
U.C.A. §35-1-78 (1953), as amended; 
U.C.A. §31A-26-301 (1953), as amended; 
U.C.A. §31A-26-303 (1953), as amended 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a tort claim, alleging negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and violation of public policy as well as 
a claim alleging bad faith in the administration of a 
worker's compensation insurance claim and breach of 
contract. 
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This is an appeal from the Orders of the District 
Court, entered on May 8, 1996 and January 7, 1997, granting 
the Defendant's Summary Judgment and dismissing Appellant's 
claims. The Orders were entered in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Leslie 
Lewis, presiding. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The plaintiff filed her complaint in March, 1994. 
After due discovery, defendants filed their first Motion for 
Summary Judgment on or about October 12, 1995, with oral 
argument held on April 9, 1996. The Court granted 
Appellees' Motion with regard to plaintiff's claims for bad 
faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
violation of public policy, but not with regard to her 
claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The 
Court below reasoned that appellant had no privity of 
contract with the Appellees and, therefore, could not 
maintain a cause of action for bad faith. (R. 314-318) 
On November 1, 1996, Appellees filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the remaining claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. After hearing on January 
7, 1997, the Court granted Appellees motion, holding that 
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appellant's claim for emotional disturbance could not stand 
because Utah law regarding a negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim requires a party to be in a "zone 
of danger" or be threatened with physical injury, neither of 
which was alleged here. (R. 377-379) 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 
Honorable Leslie Lewis, Third District Court Judge, 
granted partial summary judgment to Appellees on Appellant's 
claims of bad faith, violation of public policy and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress on April 6, 
1996 and granted summary judgment to Appellees on the 
Appellant's remaining claim of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress on January 7, 1997. 
D. Facts 
The following facts were not disputed below: 
1. Appellees are self-insured for purposes of Worker's 
Compensation, pursuant to U.C.A. §35-1-1, et seq. (1953), as 
amended. (Plaintiff's Complaint 11; Record 1-8) 
(Hereinafter, the Record on Appeal will be abbreviated as 
"R") 
2. The Western Region Claims Office of Appellee May 
Department Stores, Inc., (hereinafter "May") located in Los 
4 
Angeles, California, administers the worker's compensation 
claims for, among other corporations owned by May, Payless 
ShoeSource, Inc. (hereinafter "Payless"), a wholly owned 
subsidiary of May. (Complaint, 510)(R. 1-8) 
3. On or about January 20, 1991, Appellant was brutally 
assaulted while employed at a Payless ShoeSource store. 
(Complaint, 19) (R.l-8) 
4. As a result of injuries sustained in that assault, 
Appellant filed a worker's compensation claim with 
Appellees. (Complaint, 510)(R. 1-8) 
5. Subsequent to the assault, Appellant terminated her 
employment with the Appellees. 
6. On October 2 and 4, 1991, Enoch Dangerfield, M.D., a 
psychiatrist hired by the Appellees, examined the Appellant. 
(R. 239-242) 
7. In June, 1992, Ralph Gant, Ph.D., a psychologist 
treating the Appellant for mental stress and injury as a 
result of the assault, concluded that the Appellant had, in 
fact, suffered such injury from the assault. Dr. Gant 
relayed his conclusions to the Appellees. (Affidavit of 
Ralph Gant, Ph.D., R. 266-268) 
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8. The Appellees did not pay Dr. Gant's bills, which 
were submitted to the Appellees. (Affidavit of Ralph Gant, 
U8, R. 349) 
9. In a letter to the Appellees, dated September 11, 
1992, Dr. Dangerfield concluded that the Appellant suffered 
mental distress and injury as a result of the assault. (R. 
239-242) 
10. In March, 1993, David L. McCann, M.D., a second 
psychiatrist hired by the Appellee, examined the Appellant 
and reached the same conclusions as Dr. Dangerfield. 
(Paragraph 11 of Undisputed Facts of Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 
349) 
11. The Appellees did not pay Dr. Gant's bills as they 
were submitted and, in fact, did not pay those bills until 
March 30, 1994, after the complaint was filed by Appellant 
in the Third District Court. (R. 243) 
12. On March 17, 1992, James L. Guinn, D.D.S., a 
dentist and Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) expert, who had 
been hired by the Appellees, examined the Appellant. (R. 
244-246) 
13. In a letter to Appellees, dated March 23, 1992, Dr. 
Guinn states that the Appellant had suffered a TMJ injury as 
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a result of the assault and that she needed surgery to 
relieve her symptoms. In that letter, Dr. Guinn supported 
surgery as proposed by Crayton Walker, D.D.S., the 
Appellant's treating dentist. (R. 244-246) 
14. On April 19, 1993, Dr. Walker, D.D.S., performed 
the surgery which Dr. Guinn, Appellees doctor, had stated 
needed to be performed on the Appellant. (R. 259) 
15. The Appellee did not pay Dr. Walker's bill until 
March 30, 1994, after the complaint was filed by Appellant 
in the Third District Court. (R. 247) 
16. On June 17, 1993, a medical panel appointed by the 
Utah Industrial Commission reviewed the treatment received 
by the Appellant and concluded that the Appellee should pay 
the Appellant's medical bills. (R. 248-255) 
17. Appellees failed to pay the Appellant's medical 
bills after the report of the medical panel, even after 
demand by the Appellant. (1118 of Undisputed Facts of 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; R. 224) 
18. In January, 1994, a hearing was held before an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Utah Industrial 
Commission. The ALJ that the Appellee should pay the 
Appellant's medical bills and instructed the Appellees 
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attorney to write an order reflecting the ALJ's conclusions. 
(1J19 of Undisputed Facts of Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 225) 
19. Appellees failed to pay the Appellant's medical 
bills even after the ALJ's findings were issued. (1120 of 
Undisputed Facts of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 225) 
20. On January 13, 1994, the Order of the Utah 
Industrial Commission, which ordered the Appellee to pay the 
Appellant's medical bills, and which was written by 
attorneys for the Appellees, was signed by the ALJ. (R. 256-
262) 
21. Appellee's still failed to pay the medical bills of 
the Appellant's, even after their attorney's wrote the order 
which was signed by the ALJ. (H22 of Undisputed Facts of 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; R. 22 5) 
22. Appellees did pay the medical bills of the 
Appellant, after the Appellant filed a Complaint in the 
Third District Court. (R. 243-247) 
23. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she 
understood that her bills would be paid by worker's 
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compensation. (Deposition of plaintiff, pp. 70-71, Exhibit C 
to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment; (R. 206-207) 
24. Appellant's allegation that Appellees acted 
negligently with regard to Appellant's credit reputation was 
supported by a claim of one incident where she was told that 
she had a "blip" on her credit. Appellant was not aware of 
any time where she was actually denied credit. (Deposition 
of Plaintiff, pp. 21-23; R. 209-211) 
25. Appellant did not return to the Utah Industrial 
Commission to seek enforcement of the ALJ's order against 
the Appellees. (H13 of Undisputed Facts of Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 
185) 
26. On or about May 8, 1996, Judge Leslie A. Lewis of 
the Third District Court granted Appellees Motion for 
Summary Judgment with regards to Appellants claims for bad 
faith, intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
violation of public policy, but not with regard to 
Appellant's claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. The District Court reasoned that Appellant had no 
privity of contract with the Appellees and, therefore, could 
not maintain a cause of action for bad faith. The District 
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Court also concluded that there was no cause of action for 
violation of public policy in Utah and that the facts did 
not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. (R. 314-318) 
27. On or about January 7, 1997, Judge Lewis granted 
Appellees Motion for Reconsideration and ordered Summary 
Judgment against the Appellant, dismissing Appellant's claim 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The 
District Court held that Appellant's claim for emotional 
distress could not stand because Utah law requires that a 
claimant be in a "zone of danger" or be threatened with 
physical injury in order to maintain a cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. (R. 377-379) 
These facts were undisputed by the parties in the trial 
court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While an employee is precluded from bringing a tort 
action against an employer, a former employee is not 
precluded from bringing such an action for torts which 
occurred after the period of employment. 
An employee may bring an action against an employer who 
acts as the employer, the worker's compensation insured, the 
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worker's compensation insurer and the worker's compensation 
insurance administrator for bad faith and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress for the employer/insurer/ 
insured/administrator's failure to pay worker's compensation 
claims on a timely and fair basis. 
A plaintiff who makes a claim for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress based on psychological injury only 
need not be in the "zone of danger" or suffer an actual 
physical injury in order to prevail on the claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM BRINGING AN ACTION 
FOR BAD FAITH AND FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AGAINST HER EMPLOYER BECAUSE 
THE UTAH WORKER'S COMPENSATION STATUTE, U.C.A. 
§35-1-60, ET SEQ., PROVIDES THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 
FOR PLAINTIFF. 
A. The Utah Code Does Not Preclude a Civil Action 
Against a Former Employer. 
While the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah 
may have exclusive jurisdiction over worker's compensation 
claims, once an order of the Commission has been entered, 
the Appellant may seek enforcement of that order with the 
Utah Industrial Commission or through the District Courts. 
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The Appellee argues that U.C.A. §35-1-60 precludes an 
action by an employee against her employer. However, that 
section precludes actions only for injuries "incurred by the 
employee in the course of or because of or arising out of 
his employment". In this case, the injury arises out of the 
failure of the employer to comply with orders of the 
Industrial Commission after the employee was no longer 
employed by the Appellee. This is not an injury "incurred 
by the employee in the course of" her employment in this 
case. 
While it is true that the original injury arose because 
the Appellant was attacked by an assailant while she was 
working as a clerk for the Appellee, the Appellant's 
subsequent mental injury (for which this action is 
maintained) arose after the Appellant no longer worked for 
the Appellees and was no longer employed by them. The 
Appellant's rationale has been recognized and accepted by 
Federal and state courts. In Tallman v. Hanssen, 427 N.W. 
2nd 868 (Iowa 1988), the Iowa Supreme Court wrote that: 
It is axiomatic that an employee's rights 
and remedies arising from an injury suffered in 
the course of employment are exclusively 
provided under Iowa Code . . . A district court 
ordinarily would have no subject matter 
jurisdiction over a claim that an employee is 
entitled to worker's compensation benefits. 
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But the exclusivity principle is limited to 
matters surrounding a job-related injury and 
does not extend to subsequent dealings during 
which a tort may arise by reason of bad faith 
on the part of an employer's insurer. 
Id. at 870 (Emphasis added) 
See also Hollman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 712 
F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1983)(statutory language of exclusivity 
did not apply to torts which "occur independent of the 
industrial injury"); Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. 
Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Maine 1978); Kaluza v. Home Insurance 
Co., 403 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1987. 
B. Failure of Appellee to Pay Appellant's Bills 
The Appellees seemed to believe below that if they paid 
the Appellant's bills, at some time, then the Appellant 
would suffer no harm. There is more to the Appellant's 
claim than the street basketball term of "No harm, no foul." 
In her complaint the Appellant states: 
That by failing to pay the medical bills 
of the Appellant as required by the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Utah, Appellees knew 
or should have known that the Appellant would 
receive continued demands for payment of the 
bills by her medical providers and that, 
thereby, the Appellant would suffer emotional 
distress and would be harmed as to her credit 
reputation. 
Complaint at paragraph 26. (R. 5) 
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In his Affidavit, Ralph Gant, Ph.D., the Appellant's 
treating psychologist, states that the Appellant told him 
that she was experiencing stress and anxiety because she was 
anxious about medical bills not being paid and that she was 
being "hounded" by medical creditors. (Gant Affidavit at §6; 
R. 267) 
Additionally, the report from Dr. Dangerfield, dated 
September 11, 1992 states that: 
She claims that bill collectors have been 
calling her -- that there are two unpaid 
anesthesiology bills, radiology charges, etc. 
She said that one or two of the providers 
turned her over to a collector, though others 
didn't. She complained bitterly that she has 
had to call the credit bureau to clear her 
credit reports, etc. (R. 240) 
While the Appellant may have understood that her bills 
would be, eventually, paid by the Appellee, it does not take 
a great leap of the imagination to understand that being 
"hounded" by creditors would be mentally stressful and cause 
anxiety, even if the bills were, eventually, paid by the 
Appellees. 
C. Appellees Failed to Comply with Orders of the 
Industrial Commission 
The Appellees below argued that the Appellant's 
recourse upon the Appellees failure to comply with orders of 
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the Utah Industrial Commission, was to go back to the 
Commission for an order penalizing the Appellee. The 
Appellees claim that Utah law provides for a fifteen percent 
penalty for failure to pay the bills, which should have been 
an adequate remedy for the Appellant. Fortunately for 
abused workers, many courts in the United States disagree 
with the Appellees. 
In Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co., 273 
N.W. 2d 220 (Wise. 1979), the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
rejected that same argument made by the Appellees and held 
that a bad faith claim could be made against the employer. 
The court in Coleman reasoned that the penalty provision 
would be applicable to an unexcused delay in payment even if 
no bad faith was shown. See also Aranda v. Insurance Co. of 
North America, 748 S.W. 2d 550 (Tex. 1988), Hayes v. Aetna 
Fire Underwriters, 609 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1980). In Izaguirre 
v. Texas Employer's Insurance Association, 749 S.W.2d 550 
(Texas. Ct. App. 1988), the court stated that: 
. . . a special relationship arises out of 
the parties' unequal bargaining power and the 
nature of the insurance contracts which would 
allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage 
of their insured's misfortunes in bargaining 
for settlement or resolution of claims. 
Id. at 554. 
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The Izaguirre court went on to state that the statutory 
regulation and existing statutory penalties were not 
adequate to equalize bargaining power between workers and 
insurers in settling claims and that bad faith claims could 
be made against the insurer. Id., at 555. 
Even though the above cases deal with bad faith claims 
against insurers, which the Utah Supreme Court has 
apparently rejected in Savage v. Educator's Insurance Co., 
874 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994), Section II of this Memorandum 
makes clear that the Appellant in this case had a special 
contractual relationship with the Appellees as an employee 
of the Appellees. 
If the Appellees are going to disobey the order of the 
Industrial Commission that their very attorney wrote, there 
is certainly no guarantee that the Appellees would comply if 
faced with only a small fifteen percent increase in the 
award to Appellant that Appellees may, someday, pay. There 
must be an effective way for an injured worker to force her 
employer to comply with an order of the Industrial 
Commission. One such way is a bad faith action against the 
employer, when that employer wears all of the hats of 
employer, insurer, insured and administrator, as in this 
case. 
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D. No Utah Statute Precludes District Court Action by 
the Appellant 
The Appellees claim that, because U.C.A. §35-1-78 
provides for continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Commission over Worker's Compensation matters, that statute 
somehow precludes the Appellant from bringing a District 
Court action for bad faith against the employer. 
However, there is no statute nor any rule of the 
Industrial Commission which precludes District Court action. 
The Appellees have argued that there is a "simple 
solution" of having the Appellant go back to the Industrial 
Commission for further orders to pay the Appellant. That 
course of action, however, assumes good faith on the part of 
the Appellees, which was clearly not shown by their course 
of dealings with the Appellant below. 
In any event, U.C.A. §31A-26-103 (1953), as amended, 
provides that: 
In addition to being subject to this and 
other chapters of this title, insurers writing 
worker's compensation insurance in this state, 
including the Worker's Compensation Fund of 
Utah, are subject to the Industrial Commission 
with respect to claims for and payment of 
compensation and benefits. (Emphasis added). 
U.C.A §31A-26-301 (1953), as amended, states: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, an 
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insurer shall timely pay every valid insurance 
claim made by an insured . . . 
(3) This section applies only to claims made 
by claimants in direct privity of contract with 
the insurer, (Emphasis added) 
U.C.A. §31A-26-303 (1953), as amended, states: 
(1) No insurer or person representing an insurer 
may engage in any unfair claim settlement practice 
. . . (Emphasis added) 
Through the provisions of U.C.A. §§31A-26-301 and 31A-
26-303 (1953), as amended, worker's compensation insurers 
(or self-insurers, such as the Appellees) are subject to bad 
faith claims for unfair claim settlement practices. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAINTAIN A BAD FAITH CLAIM 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS. 
In the District Court below, the Appellees relied upon 
Savage v. Educator's Insurance Company, 874 P.2d 130 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). However that reliance is misplaced and is 
based on a misreading of this Courts holding in Savage. 
In Savage, the employer, the Jordan School District, 
was self-insured for its worker's compensation insurance. 
The District contracted with Educator's Mutual to administer 
the District's worker's compensation insurance policy. Id. 
at 130. 
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In Savage, the Appellant was injured while on the job 
with the school district. Because of an alleged failure by 
Educator's to pay medical bills incurred as a result of that 
injury, Savage filed a complaint against Educator's alleging 
lack of good faith and fair dealing, later amending the 
complaint to include breach of contract, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, etc. Those claims fairly 
mirror the claims made by the Appellant in this instant 
case. 
Educator's filed a motion to dismiss Savage's claim, 
basing their argument on the premise that Savage was not in 
privity of contract with Educator's. The Court of Appeals 
agreed that Savage was not in privity of contract with 
Educator's (the insurance administrator) and dismissed her 
claims. 
The Appellee here argues that an injured party has no 
right to bring an action against an insurance company for 
lack of good faith and fair dealing where is no contractual 
relationship between the injured party and the insurance 
company. Pixton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, 800 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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However, this case differs significantly from both 
Savage and Pixton in that, in this case, the Appellant is_ in 
privity of contract with the Appellee. 
Appellee admits below in their statement of facts in 
their Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment. (§3 
of Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment; R. 184) 
Additionally, the Appellee here acts as its own 
insurance administrator. Unlike the Appellee insurance 
administrator in Savage, which was a third-party entity, the 
Appellee here is the insured, the insurer, the insurance 
administrator and the employer of the Appellant. As an 
employee of the Appellee, the Appellant has privity of 
contract through that relationship. 
In apparently placing its reliance on footnote 1 of 
Savage, Appellee misreads that footnote. That footnote 
states: 
As Educators correctly points out, the 
District is self-insured. Educator's contract with 
the District is to administer the District's worker's 
compensation claims rather than to provide the 
insurance. This departure from the typical employer/ 
insurer relationship does not affect our holding today 
because in either situation the subject contract is 
between the employer and the insurance company. 
Id. at 131. (Emphasis added) 
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First, there is no "contract" between the Appellee and 
itself in this case. The only contract in this case is an 
implied employment contract between the Appellant and the 
Appellees. 
Second, unlike Educator!s and the school district in 
Savage, nowhere does either Appellee in this case argue that 
it is merely an administrator of the other's self-insured 
worker's compensation plan. In fact, in paragraph 8 of its 
Answer to the Appellant's Complaint, the Appellees state 
that they: 
. . . admit that these answering 
Appellees provided their own worker's 
compensation claims coverage and claims 
processing . . . (Emphasis added). (R. 18) 
The Appellees in this case admit that they: 
1) Are self-insured for worker's compensation 
purposes; 
2) Provide their own claims processing; 
3) That Appellee Payless is a subsidiary of 
Appellee May. 
4) That Appellant is an employee of the Appellee. 
In this case the employer (May Department Stores and 
Payless Shoe Stores), the insurance company (also May 
Department Stores and Payless Shoe Stores) and the insurance 
administrator (also May Department Stores and Payless Shoe 
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Stores) are the same entity. 
Unlike the defendant's in Savage, in this case the 
Appellant's wear all of the hats of employer, insurer, 
insured and administrator. 
Savage and Pixton are distinguishable from the facts 
present in this case. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS BARRED BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF 
DID NOT SUFFER ACTUAL PHYSICAL INJURY FROM THE 
DEFENDANTS ACTIONS. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Hansen v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. 858 P.2d 970, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 54 (Utah 1993), 
examined the issue of whether or not a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress could be claimed absent a 
physical injury. After reviewing its decision in Johnson v. 
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), the court held that a 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be 
maintained for mental injury only. 
Although many courts agree that a 
Appellant must establish some accompanying 
physical manifestation in order to recover for 
NIED [negligent infliction of emotional 
distress], they differ widely regarding the 
nature of evidence sufficient to establish such 
harm. See, e.g., DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 
744 P.2d 705, 710 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) 
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(defining standard for injury as "physical harm 
or medically identifiable effect"); Cathcart v. 
Keene Indus. Insulation, 324 Pa. Super. 123, 
471 A.2d 493, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (same); 
Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 
431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (recognizing ingestion of 
frightening or noxious substance as sufficient 
physical injury). The language used in section 
313 of the Restatement provides some guidance. 
Subsection (1) allows recovery for "illness or 
bodily harm." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
313(1) (1965) (emphasis added). The drafters' 
use of "or" rather than "and" shows an 
intention to allow a Appellant to recover not 
only where bodily harm results from emotional 
trauma, but where "illness" results as well. 
"Illness" is "an unhealthy condition of body or 
mind." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 56 6 
(1981). From this we conclude that either 
physical or mental illness may support the NIED 
cause of action. 
A rule allowing recovery for mental 
illness as well as physical injury serves a 
major purpose of the injury requirement --
ensuring genuineness of claims. Given recent 
medical advances in the fields of psychiatry 
and psychology, it is now possible to establish 
emotional illness with some degree of 
certainty. See Terry M. Dworkin, Fear of 
Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A 
Solution or a Pandora's Box? 53 Fordham L. Rev. 
527, 532-33 (1984). A Appellant who can 
establish through appropriate expert testimony 
that he or she suffers from mental illness as a 
result of a Appellees negligent conduct may 
maintain an action for NIED. 
We emphasize, however, that the emotional 
distress suffered must be severe; it must be 
such that "a reasonable [person,] normally 
constituted, would be unable to adequately cope 
with the mental stress engendered by the 
circumstances of the case." Rodrigues v. State, 
472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) 
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Id, at 973. (Emphasis added) 
Under the rule outlined in Hansen, it is not necessary 
for the xAppellant to be a "zone of danger" for physical harm 
in order to maintain a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress based purely on mental injury. It is 
enough for the Appellant to suffer purely from mental 
injury. As the affidavit of Ralph Gant, Ph.D., the 
Appellant's treating psychologist states, the Appellant has 
certainly suffered mental injury at the hands of these 
Appellees. (R. 266-268). 
In the earlier case of Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, 830 
P.2d 236 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court examined a case 
where four people received an electrical shock while boating 
at Lake Powell. The plaintiff claimed to have sustained 
psychological injury from fear when she witnessed harm to 
her son who had, along with three others, received an 
electrical shock. The plaintiff had, herself, not been in 
the water nor had she received an electrical shock or other 
physical injury. The defendants moved for summary judgment 
on the grounds that the plaintiff had not been in danger of 
drowning or receiving an electrical shock nor did she fear 
at the time that she would drown or receive an electrical 
shock. Plaintiff claimed that the facts of the case, and 
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her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
brought her within the ambit of section 313 of the 
Restatement of Torts 2d. 
In Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, supra, the Utah Supreme 
Court again discussed Judge Durham's opinion m Jonnson v. 
Rogers, supra, the seminal case discussing the theory of 
"zone of danger" and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. The Court also discussed the application of 
section 313 of the Restatement of Torts 2d. 
The Court m Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats stated: 
Negligent infliction of injury occurs when a 
person breaches a duty of care that he or she owes to 
other persons. Those persons within the scope or 
"zone" of the defendant's duty are classed as "victims" 
of an accident, whether or not they incur injuries 
themselves. "Bystanders" are those persons outside the 
scope of the defendant's duty of care who may witness 
or be affected by the accident which as resulted from 
the breach. In Johnson, a majority of this court 
adopted the "zone of danger" theory of recovery for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. This 
theory, found m section 313 of the Restatement, allows 
recovery only for those who are "victims" of another's 
breach of duty. (Emphasis added) 
Id. at 239. 
The Court went on the discuss how section 313 and the 
"zone of danger" theory plays out with regard to a plaintiff 
who is not physically injured during an occurrence. 
Subsection (1) of section 313 imposes 
liability on a defendant who causes emotional distress 
if the defendant knows that his or her conduct involved 
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an unreasonable risk of emotional distress "otherwise 
than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third 
person." 
Subsection (2) of section 313 is clear in its 
requirement that those seeking to recover for emotional 
distress caused by witnessing injury to others much be 
within the zone of danger created by the defendant's 
breach of duty. 
A reading of the two subsections in section 
313 shows that the subsections contain the requirement 
that a plaintiff be within the zone of danger to 
recover for emotional distress caused by an accident if 
the plaintiff is not physically injured in the 
accident. (Emphasis added) 
Id. At 240. 
So, m this case, the question to be answered is: 
1) Did the Appellees owe a duty of care to the 
Appellant? 
If the Appellees owed a duty of care to the Appellant 
in this case, then she was within the "zone of danger", and 
was a "victim" of the Appellee's negligence (as it may be 
proved to the trier of fact), as outlined by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats and no physical 
harm is required. 
Apparently a fear is safety is not required either. Comment on Subsection 
(2) of section 313 of the Restatement of Torts states: 
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In any event, the p l a i n t i f f has manifested physical 
symptoms of her injury in the form of panic at tacks and the 
continued need for psych ia t r i c care and the administration 
of psychotropic medication. 
Also, the Appellees argument below ignores the very 
rea l injury that occurs to one who has incurred emotional 
d i s t r e s s . The Appellees would have the court ignore rea l 
injury tha t occurs with emotional d i s t r e s s and require that 
a physical injury be present - even when the physical injury 
would be, of i t s e l f , inconsequential . In other words, the 
Appellees argument would allow a defendant to negl igent ly 
t r e a t individuals in any fashion that they wanted to as long 
as the defendant did not ac tua l ly physical ly injure the 
ind iv idua l . 
To deny the Appellant the r ight to bring a claim for 
negligent i n f l i c t i o n of emotional d i s t r e s s for a mental 
injury on the grounds tha t she did not suffer a concurrent 
physical injury would allow a defendant to i n f l i c t a wide 
d. The r u l e s t a t e d in Subsection (1) a p p l i e s only where the 
n e g l i g e n t conduct of the ac to r t h r e a t e n s t he o ther with emotional 
d i s t r e s s l i k e l y to r e s u l t in bod i ly harm because of the o t h e r ' s 
f r i g h t , shock, or o the r emotional d i s t u r b a n c e , a r i s i n g out of fear 
for h i s own s a f e t y , or the invas ion of h i s own i n t e r e s t s . 
(Emphasis added) 
Here, t he defendants have invaded an i n t e r e s t of the p l a i n t i f f , o ther 
then p u t t i n g her in fear of her own s a f e t y . 
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range of very real injury on plaintiffs without allowing the 
injured party any recourse. 
To make such a ruling would deny the existence of very 
real psychological and emotional abuses which occur daily in 
our society. 
CONCLUSION 
The Worker's Compensation act does not provide an 
exclusive remedy for injuries suffered by a worker outside 
of the employment relationship, or injuries which occur as a 
result of bad faith on the part of the employer in 
administering worker's compensation insurance. 
Appellant, through her employment relationship with the 
Appellees, had the necessary privity of contract in order to 
bring a bad faith action. In this case, the Appellees wore 
all of the hats of employer/insurer/insured/administrator. 
All of the necessary elements of negligent infliction 
of emotional distress exist in this case, and the Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized such an action for mental 
injury alone in Hansen. 
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